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Honor and Compromise, and Getting History 
Right 
 
Allen Guelzo  
How the media’s attacks on John F. Kelly’s Civil War comments missed the mark by a mile. 
White House Chief of Staff John F. Kelly does not have a Ph.D. in history, although he does 
have two master’s degrees, in Strategic Studies (from the National Defense University) and in 
National Security Affairs from the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. So perhaps it was 
simply that he believed what he said about the Civil War this past Monday on Laura Ingraham’s 
new Fox News ‘Ingraham Angle’ was so innocuous that he could also believe that it wouldn’t 
even become a blip on anyone’s radar screen. 
He could not have been more wrong. Asked for comment on the decision of Christ Episcopal 
Church in Alexandria, Virginia, to remove two identifying plaques, marking pews occupied by 
George Washington and Robert E. Lee, Kelly responded, “Robert E. Lee was an honorable 
man.” When Lee resigned his commission as the colonel of the 1st U.S. Cavalry in April 1861 
and accepted a general’s commission in the service of the breakaway Southern Confederacy, 
Kelly added, he was simply acting in defense of his native state of Virginia. “He was a man that 
gave up his country to fight for his state, which 150 years ago was more important than country. 
It was always loyalty to state first back in those days. Now it’s different today.” 
But Kelly didn’t stop there. He went on to add that the reason “an honorable man” found it 
necessary to make such a decision in the first place was because of the bungling of wooden-
headed politicians. The Civil War was triggered by what Kelly called “the lack of an ability to 
compromise… and men and women of good faith on both sides made their stand where their 
conscience had them make their stand.” 
This touched off not only political fire—that Kelly would seem to be justifying the man who, 
especially since the August 12th riot in Charlottesville, has become a symbol for the American 
Left of much that is repugnant in American life—but historical fire as well. After all, Kelly was 
describing as “honorable” an American soldier who raised his hand against his own flag, and in 
defense of a cause that placed the slavery of 3.9 million African Americans among its principal 
reasons for fighting. Both CNN and the Washington Post rushed to enlist commentary from 
prominent academic historians, condemning Kelly’s remarks. Juana Summers, writing for CNN 
Politics, cited African American historian Edna Greene Medford and the president of the 
American Historical Association, James Grossman, who criticized Kelly as “just too simplistic.” 
Grossman particularly scorned Kelly’s comments on “lack of an ability to compromise” as 
“fantasies.” Grossman asked, “What compromise was available once states had made it clear that 
they would secede from any nation that would interfere with their right to own human beings? 
Prolonging the enslavement of those people?” 
The Washington Post turned to Yale’s David Blight and Columbia’s Stephanie McCurry for 
even more stringent criticisms of Kelly. McCurry accused Kelly of promoting a ‘Lost Cause’ 
view of the Civil War, a version of the war’s origins which insisted that state rights or tariffs or 
resistance to centralized government was the “real” Southern motive for secession and the war 
that followed, rather than the defense of slavery. “What’s so strange about this statement is how 
closely it tracks or resembles the view of the Civil War that the South had finally got the nation 
to embrace by the early 20th century,” she said. “It’s the Jim Crow version of the causes of the 
Civil War. I mean, it tracks all of the major talking points of this pro-Confederate view of the 
Civil War.” McCurry professed incredulity at Kelly’s naivety. “It was not about slavery, it was 
about honorable men fighting for honorable causes?” McCurry said. “Well, what was the cause? 
[…] The reason there was no compromise possible was that people in the country could not 
agree over the wisdom of the continued and expanding enslavement of millions of African 
Americans.” 
Simplification is the bane of good history. Unfortunately, simplification is what the 24/7 media-
cycle feeds upon, and it did not take long before the comments were subjected to the most dreary 
and hyper-compressed of conclusions, starting with the New York Times editorial board, which 
fatuously declaimed that Kelly’s “central message is, ‘Racists, we’re your guys.’” 
If so, there have been a lot more “racists” in the fields of historical academe than we ever dreamt. 
The great Allan Nevins, whose multi-volume Ordeal of the Union series dominated the field of 
Civil War history in the era of the Civil War Centennial, entitled one of the chapters in The 
Emergence of Lincoln, “The Failure of Compromise.” Nevins described “the thinking” of North 
and South alike as “largely irrational, governed by subconscious memories, frustrated desires, 
and the distortions of politicians and editors.” 
Nor was it the Lost Cause mythmakers who invented the idea that the war was caused by a 
“blundering generation” of politicians. That was the argument of Progressive historians of the 
generation preceding Nevins. As James Garfield Randall (whose textbook on the Civil War era 
was the standard in college classrooms until the 1980s) wrote, “To suppose that the Union could 
not have been continued or slavery outmoded without the war and without the corrupt 
concomitants of the war, is hardly an enlightened assumption.” Instead, the American mind of 
the 1860s became “a sorry mélange of party bile, crisis melodrama, inflated eloquence, unreason, 
religious fury, self-righteous, unctuous self-deception and hate”—somewhat like the New York 
Times editorial board. Northerners, Randall believed, were particularly prone to be obdurate 
because they regarded “war as an elemental, purifying force”—in much the same way that it 
appears Kelly’s critics would like to regard the Civil War. 
The fundamental problem lies in the word compromise. After all, in her 2012 book, Confederate 
Reckoning, McCurry herself described the rush to Southern secession as leaving Southern 
Unionists with “no power to deliver the compromise necessary” to “hold their states back from 
the precipice of secession.” The real objection seems to be that anyone today should ever 
imagine that there was anything about slavery that could be the basis of compromise—which is, 
in itself, an uncompromising position and, presumably, an example of what Kelly was talking 
about. The 750,000 soldiers who died in the war might have had something to say about the 
desirability of compromise, but their voices have long since been stilled. 
There were, in fact, numerous proposals for compromise on offer during the nervous “secession 
winter” of 1860-61, two of them hatched in Congress: the Crittenden Compromise of December 
18, 1860, and the Washington Peace Convention (February 4-27, 1861). But both of them fell 
colossally flat. Why? Partly because when Southerners spoke of  “compromise,” what they really 
meant was “concession,” especially the concession of a federal slave code that would nationalize 
legalized slavery across most of the nation. 
But another aspect of the problem was that Northerners, including Abraham Lincoln, simply 
could not believe that the South wasn’t simply bluffing. Richard Yates, Lincoln’s Illinois 
political ally, laughed-off Southern threats of secession and civil war as mere stereotypical 
Southern bluster. “We are told that the South will not submit and that the Union is to be 
dissolved,” Yates said. “Do you want my advice on this subject? Then all I have to say is, keep 
cool. […] I confess I have but little fears of secession or disunion. […] We believe it will not be 
one year till the whole South, except the traitors bent on disunion… will hail the election of Mr. 
Lincoln as one of the greatest blessings.” Why compromise when you don’t believe there will be 
any penalty for remaining unmoved? 
Even Lincoln, who was ready to go so far as to offer guarantees to the Southern states for slavery 
within their own boundaries, drew the line at allowing slavery to be legalized in the western 
territories. “Let there be no compromise on slavery extension,” Lincoln wrote. And if 
Southerners thought their solution lay in seceding from the Union, then “My opinion is that no 
state can, in any way lawfully, get out of the Union, without the consent of the others; and that it 
is the duty of the President, and other government functionaries to run the machine as it is.” But 
Lincoln likewise dismissed the possibility that the secession crisis would come to war. “There is 
really no crisis except an artificial one!” he said in a speech on February 15, 1861. “There is no 
crisis, excepting such a one as may be gotten up at any time by designing politicians.” 
Randall and Nevins were wrong to attribute the “inability to compromise” to “blundering.” Both 
sides in 1861 were actually driven by the most glittering, hard-edged logic. But logic can be just 
as uncompromising as stupidity, and in this case it provided a lethal formula in which both sides 
refused compromise and then dismissed any need for compromise. Four years later, in his second 
Inaugural Address, Lincoln acknowledged the hardness of that logic (and in precisely the terms 
Kelly used about the “lack of an ability to compromise”) when he said, “Both parties deprecated 
war, but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive, and the other would 
accept war rather than let it perish, and the war came.” 
Nor was Kelly stretching points by describing Robert E. Lee as “an honorable man.” Honorable 
men are sometimes called upon to serve bad causes, something both Lee and Ulysses Grant 
experienced while serving in the U.S. Army during the Mexican-American War. “To this day,” 
Grant wrote in 1885, he regarded the Mexican conflict as “one of the most unjust ever waged by 
a stronger against a weaker nation,” and Lee agreed, saying that, “It is true we bullied” Mexico. 
“Of that I am ashamed, as She was the weaker party.” 
Grant’s own opinion of Lee ratifies Kelly’s. At Appomattox, Grant “felt like anything rather than 
rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so 
much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever 
fought, and one for which there was the least excuse.” Even then, Grant did “not question… the 
sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us.” In fact, not even Winston 
Churchill, as World War II raged, would withhold a word of praise to an honorable opponent in 
the German army, Erwin Rommel: “We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us, and, 
may I say across the havoc of war, a great general.” 
I may, in some respects, actually be less forgiving than Grant, in that I think Lee’s decision to 
serve the Confederacy was at least treasonous, if not an act of treason. (It is odd that the New 
York Times did not seem to regard treason worth complaining about.) But Kelly was right to 
observe that there were legal and constitutional questions that complicate that judgment, and 
which prevented Lee from actually being tried for treason after the war. The most significant of 
these, as Lee himself pointed out before a congressional committee in 1866, was the uncertain 
constitutional relationship between state and national citizenship. “The act of Virginia, in 
withdrawing herself from the United States, carried me along as a citizen of Virginia,” Lee 
insisted, “her laws and her acts were binding on me.” 
That is hardly unreasonable. Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution was 
maddeningly vague on the relationship between national and state citizenship, and the obligation 
to respect the “privileges and immunities” they entailed. Whatever distaste I feel for Lee’s cause, 
no one was ever able to accuse him of ordering wartime atrocities. Others did order them, but not 
Lee. Even Lincoln, who wished in 1863 that he had had authority to arrest Lee before Lee could 
join the Confederacy, acknowledged in 1865, when shown a photograph of Lee, that: “It is a 
good face; it is the face of a noble, noble, brave man.” 
“The past is a foreign country,” wrote the British novelist L.P. Hartley, “they do things 
differently there.” It is also a complicated country, and it doesn’t pay to rush through its 
landscape, looking for quick gotcha! moments. John Kelly may not be an historian, but he has 
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